In one doomsday scenario, rocket attacks on the nuclear waste stored at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station send plumes of dangerous radiation skyward.

Critics in Southern California spend a lot of time worrying about the safety of the 3.6 million pounds of spent fuel entombed on the bluff above the blue Pacific — but the U.S. Government Accountability Office fixes its gaze on more mundane, and perhaps more terrifying, scenarios involving much smaller amounts of nuclear material routinely used by businesses, hospitals, universities and the like.

GAO

“The risks of an attack using a dirty bomb — a weapon that combines a conventional explosive, like dynamite, with radioactive material — are increasing and the costs could be devastating,” said the GAO in a snapshot released Tuesday, April 5.

“For example, weaknesses in Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing for radioactive materials make it too easy for bad actors to obtain them, and NRC’s security requirements don’t account for the potentially devastating effects of a dirty bomb, such as billions of dollars in cleanup costs and deaths from chaotic evacuations.”

More than 2,000 “nuclear materials events” — including lost or stolen radioactive material, radiation overexposures, leaks of radioactive material and more — were reported by the NRC between 2010 and 2019, the GAO found.

In  April 2019, an Arizona technician was arrested after stealing three radioactive devices from his workplace. According to a court filing, the technician intended to release the radioactive materials at a shopping mall, but was stopped before he could do any harm.

An accident at the University of Washington in 2019, involving a small amount of material, required clean-up and other costs of $150 million for one building alone, the GAO said.

In 2016, the GAO created a fake company to get a license for radioactive materials. GAO altered the license “and used it to obtain commitments to acquire a dangerous quantity of material.”

“The number of incidents of thefts, lost shipments, and careless mishandling are outrageously large,” said Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear power safety for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit NRC watchdog.

“Even though very few of these lead to significant radiological consequences to the public, the NRC’s lax requirements fall short of best practices.”

Common stuff

Radioactive material is used in many medical and industrial settings in Southern California and throughout the nation. Small amounts help create images of organs, so doctors can find, identify and track tumors. Radioactive materials are used to kill cancer cells, shrink tumors and alleviate pain.

But security is an increasingly acute issue, the GAO said.

GAO

In 2018, the GAO reported that officials at U.S. airports had not verified the legitimacy of all licenses for imported radioactive materials.

“GAO has repeatedly found potential security weaknesses at medical and industrial locations storing such materials in the U.S.,” it said in one of many reports on the issue over the past several years.

“For example, in 2014, GAO reported that an individual had been given unescorted access to high-risk radioactive materials, even though he had two convictions for terroristic threat. Furthermore, small quantities of radioactive materials located within the same facility are not subject to enhanced security requirements that the total amount would be required to meet.”

NRC spokesman David McIntyre stressed that the snapshot released Thursday, April 5 summarizes the GAO’s work over the last few years and doesn’t present any new findings. Nor is it a warning of any imminent danger of a dirty bomb or other types of nefarious action involving radioactive materials, he said.

“GAO has issued several recommendations over the years relating to security of radioactive materials. The NRC has disagreed with some and has accepted and implemented others. Some remain ‘open’ but staff continues to make progress in implementing them,” he said.

Medical uses for radioactive material (GAO)

How to fix

The NRC has strong security requirements for large quantities of radioactive material, like what’s found at San Onofre, but not so much for small quantities “that can have significant socioeconomic consequences, even if they do not cause immediate deaths from radiation exposure,” the GAO said.

The GAO has recommended several fixes that NRC has not yet made, including considering socioeconomic consequences and deaths from evacuations when determining what security measures should be required for high-risk radioactive materials; and developing a strategy to use alternative technologies.

There are less dangerous ways to get many of the jobs done that also reduce the risk of a dirty bomb, the GAO said. For example, X-ray provides a technically viable alternative to cesium-137 blood irradiators. Congress should work on a national strategy supporting such alternative technologies, the GAO said.

The NRC encourages the use of alternative technologies, such as X-ray devices instead of cesium-137 irradiators, but has no authority to mandate such a choice by a license holder, McIntyre said. The Department of Energy, through the National Nuclear Security Administration, has a program to encourage hospitals and other license holders to switch to alternative technologies.

Lyman, of the Union of Concerned Scientists, acknowledged that the NRC has taken some action to address the most egregious problems the GAO has identified over the years, but has not gone as far as many want.

“I do support the effort for better tracking and security of radioactive sources,” Lyman said.

McIntyre said that the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for assessing impacts to the U.S. homeland from any sort of attack, including dirty bombs.

The NRC and the state governments it works with “have established a strong regulatory framework to ensure the safety, security, and control of radioactive material,” he said. “They engage in extensive interagency coordination to ensure a strong national infrastructure for radioactive source management and protection. The requirements are appropriate for the risk associated with radioactive materials in use in the United States. The NRC monitors the threat environment on an ongoing basis, evaluates incidents and events reported by licensees. If circumstances warrant changes to our requirements, we will take appropriate action.”

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