India is on everybody’s mind. Its relationship with Russia during Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has become a headache for much of the United Nations, while the continued rise of China has renewed engagement amongst the Quad, an informal security agreement between the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India. In this context some argue that the Quad should be integrated into a more formal military alliance – an “Asian NATO” – to develop a shared security commitment in the face of rising threats.

These arguments get the causality backwards. States do not see threats better because they ally; they ally because they see threats. The Biden administration should not pressure India into an “Asian NATO” because such an endeavor would lack conditions of support, lead to unintended consequences, and divert attention away from important non-military affairs currently addressed by the Quad, such as public health and infrastructure security.

Right now, the Quad is an informal alignment for engaging on security issues that include everything from public health and supply-chain resilience. While its remit can be vague, the alignment has led to concrete gains in areas including nuclear collaboration and joint naval exercises. Instead of focusing on Chinese containment, it supports broad goals grounded in India’s insistence that it must be “for something, not against somebody.”

The basic rule of alliances is that they must provide a public good for all states involved. States will only balance in the presence of what they deem a true threat.

India’s declining military spending shows it doesn’t perceive China as a significant threat. States calculate threats based on size, proximity, and military power. While China’s economy is the largest in the world in terms of domestic output, its long-term economic outlook is much weaker due to lockdowns, increasing instability, and demographic burdens. The mountainous geography that separates the two also makes it difficult to launch an invasion that could capture significant territory or overthrow the Indian government.

Formalizing an alliance will also lead to unintended consequences.  If someone else helps cover your defense in a fight, you’re more likely to drag it out. This is a big concern regarding India, a state that still has disputes with fellow nuclear powers such as Pakistan and China. In particular, India and Pakistan remain the only nuclear states to engage in sustained military conflict. While thankfully this dispute didn’t end in nuclear war, an alliance would put us in uncharted territory.

Finally, a formal agreement would be a fossilized one. Historically, alliances focus on defense spending, military coordination, and technology sharing. The Ukrainian crisis shows that great powers now primarily fight one another through economic means, such as sanctions and asset seizures. The Quad can be an opportunity to focus on preventative action such as limiting China’s economic influence from Huawei and the Belt and Road Initiative. Keeping the Quad as an informal alignment limited to the founders would give everyone more voice and keep the focus on infrastructure and economic development.

While an Asian NATO could help India decouple from Russia, this is unnecessary because the process is already underway. Proponents point to India’s abstention from the U.N. Security Council, purchase of Russian arms and fuel, and discussions on developing a ruble-rupee trade mechanism as signs that the commitment remains strong. However, these actions reflect the long-incurred fixed costs of the India-Russia relationship that goes back to 1971 and India’s decades-long reliance on Russian infrastructure. That path-dependence won’t change overnight even in a crisis as big as this one. Regardless, India shows signs of voluntarily decoupling by reducing its share of Russian arms and engaging with the West on new deals for military infrastructure.

If decoupling is in India’s best interest, the reason it may take a while is due to domestic concerns, not international ones. Weak state capacity and fragmentation across ethnocultural lines make it difficult to develop a long-term strategy grounded in power politics. Since these issues can’t be addressed by international pressure, the best option is to engage on India’s terms as it continues to improve and centralize state capacity.

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The desire to confront China is unnecessary given the trajectory of the India-China relationship. While China has pushed for diplomatic engagement, relations remain testy due to the recent standoff in eastern Ladakh. The two’s economic relationship is likely to weaken further due to “Atmanirbhar Bharat”; India’s plan to shift away from supply-chain risks, especially in China.

Alliances don’t create interests; they recognize them. The Quad provides us with the tools we need to address the real security issues of economic competition and health coordination. An “Asian NATO” with India would not only distract us but create new problems and conflicts. The Biden administration should ignore such calls and focus on harnessing institutions as they exist and working with states as they are.

Yameen Huq is a cybersecurity professional and Strategic Leaders Fellow at the John Quincy Adams Society. Previously, he was a consultant specializing in analytics, cybersecurity, and strategy for public and private-sector clients. The opinions expressed in this post are his own and do not reflect on those of his employer. Follow him on Twitter here.